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Abstract: 
The European Union has been recently exposed to the multiple shocks of 
the Great Recession, the migrant crisis, and Brexit. Populist parties have 
been, either directly or indirectly, considered the principal beneficiaries of 
these crises in light of their Eurosceptic profiles. In this introductory article, 
we lay out the conceptual and analytical tools necessary to identify populist 
Eurosceptic actors, and systematically tackle the under-explored link 
between populist Eurosceptic framing and the unfolding of the different 
European crises. While we provide a framework to assess (alleged) 
changes in the framing of these parties, we also contend that these parties 
may have released effects in the political process by conditioning shifts in 
the positions on Europe of their mainstream competitors. In doing so, we 
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The European Union (EU) has been exposed to multiple stresses during the past decade. 
Virtually every EU member state has been affected (albeit to varying degree) by the negative 
consequences of the economic and financial crisis (the so-called ‘Great Recession’) that 
unfolded after 2008. While the actual causes of this crisis are manifold, its occurrence 
primarily emphasised the structural limits of the Eurozone as a currency union without fiscal 
coordination. Just as the economies of member states were exiting the most severe phase of 
the crisis and finally undergoing recovery, a new crisis struck the EU. Amid an increasingly 
instable international political scenario, migrants from near East and African countries 
reached EU borders in exceptional numbers. In the summer of 2015, the migrant crisis put 
under considerable strain the internal decision-making of the EU – not to mention the 
consensus about any international principles of solidarity. In June 2016, the decision of the 
UK’s referendum to opt for ‘Brexit’ came across as the end result of a prolonged legitimacy 
crisis.  
 Already in the months preceding the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, a 
number of journalistic accounts anticipated a populist Eurosceptic landslide as one of the 
likeliest outcomes of the vote. While this alarmist scenario did not materialise in full (e.g. 
Mudde 2014), the reason for assuming a populist takeover in times of crisis rests both on the 
ideological persuasion(s) of these actors and the loss of legitimacy that recently seemed to 
affect the EU. Populist organisations traditionally voiced their opposition to ‘Europe’i on the 
basis of a composite series of arguments (Taggart 1998; Hooghe et al. 2002; de Vries and 
Edwards 2009). Moreover, their ability to profit from moments of (real or perceived) crisis 
instinctively elevated them to potential beneficiaries of these particular events. 
Straying from accounts on the performance of these parties in the electoral market, the 
Special Issue seeks to shed light on the relation between the populist politics of 
Euroscepticism and the recent crises that have hit the EU. With this objective in mind, we aim 
to contribute to the existing literature on populism and Euroscepticism by concentrating on 
what political parties say and do – in other words, the ‘supply side’ of populist Eurosceptic 
politics. We do so in multiple ways: first, by ascertaining if and how the ideological contours of 
Euroscepticism have changed as a result of these crises (i.e. the ‘inward’ aspect); second, by 
reinstating the role of crises in the stances of populist Eurosceptic actors (i.e. the ‘functional’ 
aspect); third, by establishing if and how these discourses have reverberated across the party-
political arena, releasing effects in the wider political process (i.e. the ‘outward’ aspect). 
 The recent economic, financial, migrant, and Brexit crises offer unprecedented 
opportunities to delve deeper into these aspects. While we are generally agnostic about the 
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possibility that populist actors may have substantively altered the content of their 
oppositional discourses as a result of these crises, we nevertheless think that parties 
expressing Euroscepticism might strategically harden their opposition to the EU, and/or 
frame the issue differently according to changing circumstances (Pirro and van Kessel 2017). 
However, the direct blaming of the EU for the unfolding of the crises has never quite been a 
concern for scholars of Euroscepticism. We are interested then to see how the EU is used in 
the critical and oppositional discourse of populist actors. For the final aspect of our enquiry, 
we are partly motivated by a growing body of literature pointing to the growing relevance of 
populist parties in their respective national arenas (e.g. van Spanje 2010; Minkenberg 2015; 
Pirro 2015). Assuming that populist (in this case, radical right) actors have effectively 
managed to exert influence on policy dimensions such as immigration or minority politics, we 
are interested to address the question of changing/additional dimensions of contestation. In 
other words, what competition dynamics unfold following the co-optation of populist radical 
issues by mainstream political parties? Does competition shift towards other (i.e. EU-related) 
policy dimensions? And what are the effects released by populist Eurosceptic actors in the 
political process? 
 This Special Issue subscribes to a pluralist approach and encourages the triangulation 
of different methods and types of data. At the same time, we believe that agreement on 
concepts and contents is of the utmost importance for the coherence of a collaborative 
project; we therefore asked authors to familiarise themselves with the guidelines (laid out 
below) in the drafting of their contributions. In the ext section, we elaborate on our 
conceptual starting points and lay out a minimal strategy to empirically assess developments 
within the populist Eurosceptic camp in times of crisis. 
 
Conceptualisation and Operationalisation 
This Special Issue outlines four key dimensions for understanding populists’ relationship with 
Europe during the last decade. As we deem populism, Euroscepticism, crisis, and impact 
interrelated, we propose a four-step model whereby each element follows one another. Our 
framework distinguishes between three concepts (populism, Euroscepticism, crisis) and a 
dynamic process (impact) in order to determine: a) how those critical events that punctuated 
European integration over the last decade affected the Eurosceptic politics of populist parties, 
and b) how the discourses and agendas propelled by these crises shaped party-political 
relationships to ‘Europe’. In outlining our theoretical framework, we deliberately adopt 
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concepts that have consolidated in the discipline over the years. While we acknowledge that 
there is considerable debate on definitions, we are keen to move beyond that to tease out the 
effects of Euroscepticism and populism on European politics. 
 
Populism 
We primarily asked contributors to this Special Issue to operate and substantiate a first 
distinction between populist and non-populist organisations on the basis of the definition 
provided by Cas Mudde (on a similarly strategy, see van Kessel 2015). According to Mudde 
(2004: 543), populism is 
 
an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, 
and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale 
(general will) of the people. 
 
One of the challenges in using populism in this project is the perennial issue of definition. As 
we have indicated above, we are keen to move beyond definitional discussions to a project 
where the utility of the concept can be measured through its application to cases. To this end, 
we are reflecting what we see as a wider trend within the study of populism to move towards 
an ideological approach (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017) and, within that category, to adopt 
Mudde’s definition. The virtue of the ideological definition is that it moves towards a more 
circumspect and circumscribed definition, where the content of the beliefs is given value. This 
is in contrast to more strategic understandings of populism (Weyland 2017), where the ideas 
propounded are much more empty signifiers in service of strategic ends. 
There are four elements of the Mudde definition that give it its utility and which 
explain the wide usage of it. Each of the elements also resonates with other definitions of 
populism. The first is the hostility towards elites and a rejection of the ‘establishment’ in 
general. The second is the valorisation of the people that is often associated with the 
importance of popular sovereignty. The third is the binary/Manichean nature of the 
opposition between the people and the elites (Hawkins 2010). The fourth element is the more 
general repudiation of politics (Taggart 2000) that is manifest in the idea that the general will 
of the people should be represented in politics and, by implication, the charge that it currently 
is not. Taken together, these are useful guides to the sort of positions that parties take. 
Contributors were asked to identify these elements in the cases that they have examined. 
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We note at least two comparative projects that have used this definition to examine a 
range of cross-national cases in multi-regional contexts and this is, at least to some extent, a 
test of the breadth of conceptualisation. The first is the comparative study of populism in 
Europe and the Americas by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012). And the second is the 
study of the reactions to populism in Europe and Latin America (Taggart and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2015).  
Individual contributions focus on the possible changes occurring in the Eurosceptic 
discourse of (right-wing, left-wing, and centrist) populist parties in different EU member 
states. Among the values of this Special Issue we indeed include its focus on different variants 
of populism; its geographical scope, willing to account for EU member states struck by one or 
more crises; and the specific European dimension under review. 
 
Euroscepticism 
Another challenge to which this Special Issue seeks to respond is integrating populism with 
Euroscepticism. Despite the unexceptional overlap between populist and Eurosceptic politics, 
we recognise that not every Eurosceptic party is necessarily populist (e.g. AKEL in Cyprus or 
the early Grünen in Germany), and not every populist party is necessarily Eurosceptic (e.g. 
NDSV in Bulgaria, Smer in Slovakia – at least, until recently). The simple observation is that 
there is no necessary convergence between populism and Euroscepticism. Non-populist 
Eurosceptic discourses could be attributed to early Green criticism of the EU, which saw it as 
an exclusive institutional arrangement that was potentially insufficiently global, too 
neoliberal, and non-environmental. In practice, however, Green parties have largely come to 
reconcile their politics with changing nature of the EU and feeling comfortable with its 
practice of non-nationalist co-operation and its practice of environmental regulation. It is also 
possible to identify populists who are not Eurosceptic. In practice, this is a very small number 
of cases, which is often better approached by seeing how different populist parties in Europe 
ascribe a different salience to European issues. As with non-populist Euroscepticism, the 
category is essentially a relatively small and diminishing number. 
In our understanding, Euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified 
opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of 
European integration” (Taggart 1998: 366). In line with the dominant scholarship on 
Euroscepticism, we further differentiate between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of Euroscepticism: 
 
Page 4 of 14
Number of Words: 4920
Politics -  Number of Words: 4920
For Review Only
 4 
‘Hard’ Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European 
political and economic integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or 
remaining a member of the EU. … ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism, by contrast, involves 
contingent or qualified opposition to European integration. (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2004: 3-4) 
 
This broad distinction, already employed in earlier work (above all, Szczerbiak and Taggart 
2008a, 2008b), provides us with ample analytical scope to tackle the question of selective or 
all-embracing emphasis on social, cultural, and/or economic arguments, and the possible 
intensification of the oppositional discourse of populist parties. The different framing of 
‘Europe’ has been previously attributed to the interests that parties defend at the national 
level as well as their belonging to the established political camp (Helbling et al. 2010). The 
analysis of populist radical right discourses during the Great Recession additionally 
demonstrated that these parties have included economic arguments in their Euroscepticism 
(Pirro and van Kessel 2017). In particular, we are interested to find out whether parties have 
‘pushed towards exit’ in times of crisis; what sorts of ‘exit’ they have advocated (e.g. from the 
Eurozone, rather than the EU); and on the basis of what arguments (e.g. national sovereignty, 
fiscal matters, etc.). The geographical scope of the Special Issue ultimately highlights patterns 
of convergence and/or divergence in the Euroscepticism of populist parties in the current 
scenario. We would also note that Brexit vote has the potential to transform ‘hard’ 
Euroscepticism from a being minority concern to being a viable political project.  
In terms of Euroscepticism, we are including parties that are both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. 
There have been usually few cases of hard Euroscepticism and therefore the bulk of the cases 
will likely be soft Euroscepticism. There are, of course, boundary issues about what crosses 
over the threshold from ‘friendly’ criticism of the EU into the zone of being soft 
Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b), but in practice it is easier to identify those 
parties that attempt to make hay out of an essentially negative attitude towards European 
integration, albeit short of advocating withdrawal, from those parties essentially supportive 
of European integration, but who feel the need to express criticism of some aspect of 
European integration (on similar problems, see Kopecký and Mudde 2002). It is a measure of 
the unusual way that the European issue is framed in politics that we would ever expect a 
substantial section of support to be unequivocal. It reflects the way in which the framing of 
‘Europe’ is very often in terms of a ‘common good’ whereas, in practice, it is essentially a 
(very) complex bundle of (often very) selective goods.  
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 For all these reasons, we need to consider the salience of European integration as a key 
aspect of our understanding of the degree of Euroscepticism. We need to be sensitive as to 




Another crucial question relates to the role of the crises. The above qualifications, in addition 
to the wavering party-based stances on ‘Europe’ in times of crisis, suggest that the coupling of 
populism and Euroscepticism may be partly situational. One of our initial assumptions indeed 
interprets possible changes in the Eurosceptic discourse of populist parties as a reaction to 
triggering factors such as the Great Recession or the humanitarian crisis. Correctly or not, this 
assumption is based on the (often under-specified) notion that populist parties thrive “in 
times of accelerated social and cultural change” (e.g. Minkenberg 2002: 339; also, Taggart 
2000; on a critique, see Mudde 2007). Whereas much of this relationship appears under-
theorised (cf. Moffitt 2015), we seek to pinpoint the actual role of these critical events, 
ascertain to what extent they effectively played a role in defining the ideological course of 
these organisations and, in that case, how they fit into the Eurosceptic discourse of populist 
parties. 
The concept of crisis etymologically subsumes a choice between stark alternatives and, 
thus, demands action. The concept has over time come to denote a transition towards 
something better, worse, or altogether different, and essentially acquired an aura of ambiguity 
proper to the emotions attached to it (Koselleck 2006: 358). Yet, it is essentially on the 
diagnoses prospected by populist Eurosceptics that we wish to concentrate. Different streams 
of literature enhance our understanding of ‘crisis’. Historical institutionalism has referred to 
‘critical junctures’ to identify periods of dramatic flux amid path-dependent stability. A critical 
juncture is appraised as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways 
in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce 
distinct legacies” (Collier and Collier 1991: 29). While departing from different 
epistemological starting points, we believe that interpreting the recent economic, financial, 
humanitarian, and Brexit crises in terms of “relatively short periods of time during which 
there is a substantial heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of 
interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348) helps us clarify some of the relational and 
dynamic elements of our analysis. 
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We therefore argue that the recent European crises may have brought about 
differential changes in institutional settings that could be difficult to alter or revert. These 
changes would reveal at different levels. On the one hand, crises could modify institutional 
trajectories, such as economic/financial and humanitarian response mechanisms, or – as the 
case of Brexit seems to suggest – entirely reconfigure standing terms of international 
cooperation. On the other, crises could manifest themselves within single organisations like 
populist parties, by affecting their discourses, or as part of structured interactions, shaking 
party systems as a whole. Within the context of structural fluidity brought about by the crises, 
it would be then easier for populist Eurosceptic parties to challenge the dominant status quo 
(i.e. the pro-European consensus); at the same time, these challenges are likely to be 
momentous, with a concrete potential to reverberate across party systems. As some of these 
crises would qualify as ‘critical junctures in-the-making’ – following recognisable exogenous 
shocks and endogenous strains, but still without new equilibriums to speak of (Roberts 2017) 
–, we would argue for a laxer reading of these events. 
Somewhat similar implications would pertain to crises as ‘transformative events’. 
Building on historical sociology, events are regarded as “occurrences that have momentous 
consequences” (Sewell 1996: 842). Crises, just like transformative events, occur in relatively 
intense bursts, emphasising their lumpy, rather than smooth, character. Their disruptiveness 
would lead to changes in cultural schemas, shifts in the allocation of resources, and the 
emergence of new power configurations. Events such as the Great Recession, the migrant 
crisis, or Brexit clearly satisfy the condition of being recognised as such by contemporary 
actors. The question of ‘durable transformation’ remains however open to debate, given the 
recent occurrence of the critical events discussed. 
Crises can be otherwise interpreted in terms of ‘focusing events’, for they can 
contribute to change the dominant issues on the agenda or in given policy domains. In other 
words, focusing events would lead to the identification of new problems or force attention 
onto issues usually downplayed or rejected by the political mainstream. Precisely for this 
reason, the European debt crisis, or the following migrant crisis, ostensibly offered 
opportunities for the mobilisation of political challengers such as populist Eurosceptic parties, 
in that they could tip the balance of contention in their favour (e.g. Birkland 1998). For some, 
the role of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the Brexit decision has been 
seen as a model for other populist actors in other EU member states to re-energise their 
Euroscepticism and to even shift towards a more overtly hard Eurosceptic position.  
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Whether full-fledged crises have actually taken place remains an empirical question. 
Despite the salience of the economic, financial, migrant, and Brexit crises across Europe, we 
acknowledge that these events have affected European countries in different ways, albeit only 
indirectly in some cases. Moreover, some countries may have dealt with them more 
successfully than others. We also realise that the downward economic trajectories of 
individual countries may be endogenous in character, thus preceding grand-scale phenomena 
like the Global Financial Crisis (Pirro 2017). This is an important caveat that helped decipher 
the varying fortunes of populist parties through the (separate or concomitant) unfolding of 
economic and/or political crises in the shadow of the Great Recession (Kriesi and Pappas 
2015). With this Special Issue, we move beyond understandings of crises as mere 
opportunities or background conditions. Contributors were therefore asked to identify the 
case-specific nature, relevance, and timing of the crises, elaborating on how these occurrences 




Finally, and in line with the aspect of change running through our understanding of crisis, we 
move our focus to the broader ‘supply side’ of Eurosceptic politics and expand our enquiry to 
party competition at large. In doing so, we intend to single out and clarify whether populist 
parties have been able to exert any sort of impact in the political process. Populist parties 
certainly do not operate in a vacuum and their (often unparalleled) role of Eurosceptic 
torchbearers may have affected (read, conditioned) the (discursive or policy) trajectory of 
other parties. Having come under the multiple pressures of political competitors and far-
reaching crises, mainstream parties may have adapted to the Eurosceptic standards set by 
populist actors. 
With an ever-growing set of contributions claiming that populist (radical right) parties 
have been able to remould the dynamics of European party competition (e.g. Bale 2003), it 
seems opportune to extend the area of enquiry beyond the more predictable areas of 
immigration and ethnic minorities (e.g. Harmel and Svåsand 1997; Pirro 2015). By impact, we 
refer to populist parties’ ability to wield direct or indirect influence on respective political 
systems in general, and policy dimensions in particular. The stimulus introduced by populist 
parties would then consist of the capacity to change course of events, which might develop 
differently otherwise (Williams 2006: 42). 
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 Party impact has been variously interpreted and tackled. In this project, we narrow 
down the analysis to the supply side of Eurosceptic politics and draw on contributions that 
have previously looked at the interaction between (populist) radical parties and their 
mainstream competitors (e.g. Minkenberg 2001; Meguid 2005). We focus both on the type of 
responses stimulated and the level at which these unfold. As for the type of responses (Downs 
2001), mainstream parties can either opt to 1) engage or 2) disengage from competition with 
their populist competitors on the European dimension, hence moving towards a deeper 
understanding of party interactions over this specific issue dimension. These strategies will 
alternatively result in: 
 
1a) collaboration with the populists on European issues; 
1b) co-optation of their Eurosceptic agenda; 
2a) attempts to isolate populists in their Eurosceptic trajectory; 
2b) attempts to ignore the Eurosceptic appeals of the populists. 
 
Given the relevance acquired by populist actors in their respective political arenas, very few 
mainstream parties will be able to ignore th  Eurosceptic pleas of their competitors (2b); we 
then assume that most of these interactions will cluster around co-optation (1b) or isolation 
(2a) strategies. 
 When the supply side of Eurosceptic politics is taken into account, we also consider the 
level at which these strategies materialise. Simply put, the Special Issue examines interactions 
between populist and mainstream parties taking place at the ‘institution-shaping’ and ‘policy-
making’ levels (Williams 2006). With the first, we indicate interactions affecting the structure 
of party competition, admittedly often bound to discursive territories, and which can be 
operationalised for instance through the analysis of political spaces (e.g. Benoit and Laver 
2006). With the second, we refer to influence exerted at the legislative level, which can be 
operationalised by systematically reconstructing the decision-making process – thus, 
ascertaining whether any Eurosceptic legislation implemented, or policy trajectory 
undertaken, can be directly attributed to populist Eurosceptic parties. This should practically 
clarify whether the influence of populist Eurosceptic actors remains a strategic-discursive 
affair, or whether their influence extends to more consequential legislative spheres. 
 
This Special Issue 
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The framework presented here and the set of contributions included in this Special Issue 
collectively offer an initial attempt to tackle the populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of 
crisis. The goal is therefore not only unravelling the substantive contents of populists’ 
Euroscepticism and monitoring its evolution over time, but also deciphering where and how 
the EU fit into the three crises identified. By delving deeper into the linkage between populist 
Euroscepticism and crises, we no longer treat crises as background conditions (e.g. Kriesi and 
Pappas 2015), but take them frontstage as integral part of populist oppositional discourses. 
Finally, where the populist politics of Euroscepticism had gained sufficient traction, we sought 
to ascertain whether populist actors managed to tip the balance of contention towards 
Euroscepticism. 
 Moving from this, we asked contributors to the Special Issue to proceed in a step-like 
manner and: a) identify populist parties; b) elaborate on the nature and possible evolution of 
their Eurosceptic agenda (e.g. from soft to hard Euroscepticism, and vice versa), as well as the 
themes (i.e. cultural, economic, etc.) deployed across relevant periods; c) identify relevant 
crises and qualify their role in terms of the Eurosceptic trajectory of populist parties (i.e. 
positioning, salience, and contents); d) ascertain whether populist Eurosceptic parties were 
able to trigger competition on ‘Europe’ with their mainstream rivals, and examine the 
responses elaborated by the latter. 
The Special Issue includes single case as well as comparative studies. Tim Bale’s article 
looks at UKIP’s transformation into a populist Eurosceptic force and its symbiotic relationship 
with the Conservative Party, prior to and amid Brexit. Gilles Ivaldi’s contribution examines the 
French Front National’s incorporation of Euroscepticism within its ideological framework 
across the recent European crises. Charles Lees’ piece discusses the emergence of the 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – Germany’s own populist Eurosceptic response to the 
crises weathered by the EU. Sofia Vasilopoulou’s contribution analyses the evolution of 
Eurosceptic stances in the Greek political context – indeed a case where populism had been a 
dominant paradigm. Andrea Pirro and Stijn van Kessel’s article looks at the changing populist 
Eurosceptic frames in the face of the multiple crises in Italy and the Netherlands. In their 
piece, Margarita Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro and Carolina Plaza-Colodro tackle the changing 
interaction between populist and Eurosceptic politics in Portugal and Spain. Finally, Nicolò 
Conti examines the attitudes of national political elites towards the EU. In the concluding 
article, Andrea Pirro, Paul Taggart, and Stijn van Kessel bring together the material from the 
individual contributions to offer a comparative overview of the findings and to reflect on the 
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implications of these findings for the study of populism, Euroscepticism, and the European 
crises.  
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